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Outside the city’s wall 
In response to Walter Gershon’s review of Art’s Way Out 
John Baldacchino 
Art’s Way Out invites readers to examine how what we call “art” enters a conditioned 
relationship with the polity that leaves the occasion of education and the condition of culture in a 
quandary that is at best inept and at worse oppressive. There are two reasons for this: (a) because 
any relationship between art and education is aporetic by dint of how they have emerged in 
between their respective autonomous and heteronomous forms of being and knowing; and (b) 
because in the volatility of representation, any cultural and educational conditioning is bound to 
vacillate between the same teleological states by which expressions of a political objective find 
themselves bookended by fascism (See Baldacchino 2012, pp. 3ff; Rose 1997, pp. 53-54). 
This is often overlooked by the constructivist expectations that are commonly invested in art and 
education. Moreover, any crossing of art with philosophy is bound to fall foul of the excessive 
desires that we project on them. This has nothing to do with a failure to see or acknowledge art 
and philosophy’s distinct specificity and forms of legitimation. Rather it has to do with the 
political framework within which discourses on art have emerged, particularly when education 
and culture are being increasingly identified with the so-called knowledge and creative 
industries.  
Unlearning what we call “art” 
As I have commented in a footnote (which is easily missed) on page 60, to speak of art and what 
“it” mediates, requires that one is mindful of the fact that art is made by someone. In the 
expectations that we invest in art we must always be careful not to project our desires for 
immanence onto an object we call a “work of art”. Likewise, one cannot forget that when 
philosophers like Georg Lukács (1971; 1974; 1975) endow art’s speciality with the fullness of 
men and women’s teleological projects, this must be considered from within the same context of 
specificity by which we mediate the world.  
What we call “art” invariably emerges in all its teleological expectations. This is an obstacle that 
artists always seek to unlearn. Unlearning has been staple to art practice and more so its 
pedagogies long before theorists and social scientists adopted unlearning as a concept in post-
colonial, race, gender and social theory. It is important to disambiguate the use of this term in art, 
because in the studio unlearning prompts a recurring point of departure by which artists unlearn 
what is meant or expected to be “art”, and by implication refute the fallacy of any future re-
learning, as found in educational and social theory.1  
 “A savage place” 
Art’s Way Out is a book of practice that corroborates Adorno’s correct admonitions when he 
cites disdainfully all those practicists who keep themselves busy by thinking that the empirical 
1 Since Art’s Way Out was published in 2012, I have published several long papers in this and other journals 
expanding on this problematic state of affairs . See Baldacchino 2014; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c. 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9450-3
assumptions of practice would suffice. (Adorno 2000, p. 6) Mindful of this risk, this book’s 
proposal of practice is intrinsically bound to what is customarily assumed to be “art-making”—
which, as a term, remains vulnerable to the instrumental contexts of other layers of practicism 
that cloak schools, museums, and any other institution with the myth of art’s usefulness 
 
The claim that one can philosophize art should raise eyebrows as it prompts the same impatience 
that one nurtures towards those proselytes who think that truth is secured by the three graces of 
art, education, and philosophy. One cannot ignore the audacity by which art and philosophy 
consciously cross each other’s paths at some risk. Citing once more Adorno the atonal composer 
and the student of no less a master of modernity than Alban Berg, one could only imagine how 
he must have felt when in his desire to follow his calling as a composer he found himself writing 
philosophy. (See Stefan Muller-Doohm 2005)  
 
Beyond those prerogatives traded by artists and philosophers, in such crossroads one cannot fail 
to recognize the all too familiar chasm of which Coleridge (another poet turned philosopher) 
hails as “that deep romantic chasm which slanted / Down the green hill athwart a cedarn cover.” 
The poet of Kubla Khan reminds us that this is “a savage place”, though equally “holy and 
enchanted.” (1997, p. 249)  
 
To claim art as a way out of the predicament of its own double bind (by reasserting the same 
bind as a strategy for exiting the parameters that make it) is to attempt to explain the non-spaces 
of a khôra and the eternal feeling of a mis-en-abyme. As a mirror within mirrors this state of 
affairs does not speak only twice as Rancière (2009) suggests with regards to art and aesthetics, 
but in innumerable ways.  
 
As such, the venture is posed eternally on the threshold of Zarathustra’s gate of the Moment 
(Nietzsche 1974, p. 78), and by implication its case could never find comfort in the hope of 
emancipation as a neutered différend. The gate is an entrance by which we exit the same polis 
that incarcerates us by the promise of irenic happiness. As art reveals this state of affairs and its 
irony shows disdain towards learning by disestablishing the benignity of such promises, we 
begin to realize that the triangulated space of the good, the true and the beautiful must be seen 
for what it is: a cultural condition purporting a strength that leaves no hope for kenotic 
autonomy. 
 
Una festa di passaggio 
 
But before one gives up on the attempt to move away from the shyster’s tricky delusion 
(Baldacchino 2012 pp. 161-162; Adorno 1990, p. 198) of a sociology of knowledge by which we 
are all too often mesmerized and expected to articulate a future (revolutionary) metaphysics, 
Art’s Way Out goes on to suggest that rather than wear a Che Guevara T-Shirt and blindly 
believe the cosmopolitan certainties promised in the school and the gallery, we hold back and 
consider the gift of a festa di passaggio, a passing fête that through irony and comedy enables 
our anger towards cruel absolutes like the holocaust—as both Roberto Benigni and Dario Fo 
have done in their work. 
 
This is possible because as the fautori, as sustainers, of art, we could safely take a distance from 
the expected rhythms of the discursive parroting that plagues the institutionalized realms of 
knowledge and culture. In this safety we would partake of a kenotic approach where grounds 
turn into horizons and where weak art is one of many attempts by which we make some sense of 
the world. 
 
While I agree with the reviewer when he reminds us that the class clown’s “neither-nor ludic act 
rarely changes even the most local of classroom practices and tends to be used as tool for the 
further othering of already marginalized students,” I should emphasize that I have no interest in 
education’s busy bodying narratives of ill-founded happiness. I would like to think that the 
reason for refusing to speak of classrooms is clearly set from the start.   
 
The reaction by which one attempts to halt the constructivist millenarians who have coopted 
schools, galleries, museums, studios, academies, and anything they could control into the 
Establishment, is understandable. However what seems to have become an inverse attempt by 
progressive, liberal and critical educators to gain progress by the same means with which 
conservatives have stultified education, remains alien to what art’s unlearning represents.  
 
Here rests my excuse for my overt emphasis on what appears to be a scopocentric 
exemplification, about which the reviewer raises a legitimate question. The choice was conscious 
by dint of its selective limitations. My attempt to bring in other forms of artistic labor that would 
suggest other forms of representation—aural as well as tactile—might appear to remain within 
the same scopic limits of a political milieu that is willfully contested. However this is inevitable 
because (a) the immutable assumptions of art, as expressed aesthetically, ethically and 
ontologically, remain and retain—for worse, more than for better—the purview of such an 
imposition; (b) because the political assumptions under examination are what they are; and (c) 
because while we think that we have broken loose from both (a) and (b) by rightly assuming (or 
desiring) to be less Occidental (which is not necessarily white, male and Eurocentric) our artistic, 
political and educational labors are invariably reduced to nothing more than a form of reversed 
Orientalism.  
 
In my attempt to articulate my choices (for which I make no apologies), I found my commentary 
catapulted towards the teleological ends by which this assumption has been historically 
conditioned. This was always intentional as my attention to Gianni Vattimo, Dario Fo, Pier Paulo 
Pasolini, Antoni Tàpies and others is no less marked by a conscious choice of those artistic 
labors whose duende never fails to lure us into the sour smell of baby’s spittle. (Lorca 1996, p.  
162) As Lorca’s poetics further confirms, this represents, time and again, the gate of that 
recurring Moment by which a lull or indeed an impasse, comes to signify the necessarily 
contingent—or better put, the kenosis of unknowing (in John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila), 
empathy (in Edith Stein), and weakness (in Gianni Vattimo). 
 
With this in mind I turn to childhood as a metaphysics where the ludic returns to the paese dei 
balocci, to toyland, and like Pinocchio (notwithstanding Agamben) we all become asini that 
realize themselves in their temporary loss of a perceived humanity. My attention to childhood in 
the works of De Chirico, Henri Rousseau and Carlo Carrà moves beyond the Occidental canon to 
which they belong, where by dint of the same canonicity a meaning of irrefutable impossibility 
becomes a powerful moment that is recalled at the very moment when an innocent child asks: 
“Mum, what is innocence?” 
 
To this effect, in Art’s Way Out, as in the works that I have written following it, I tried to do with 
art what the implement of other than art cannot do. This is what education and politics 
continuously attempt by the very dint of their existence as human acts, even when in their 
attempt to use art as a form of emancipation or inclusion, human beings find themselves 
excluded and oppressed by fellow asini in toyland’s perpetual polity.  
 
Art’s travesty 
 
In art’s travesty one looks for the root of many other travesties. But at the same time one is also 
expected to stop from universalizing the peculiarity that throws art into the abyss of its willed 
refutations. This is why I would be disinclined to include what the reviewer collates as 
“indigenous art, non-Western ‘low’ art, … craft.” My exclusion comes from an unwillingness to 
assume these human deeds collectively under the umbrella of what we call “art” as to do so 
would amount to reverse Orientalism.  
 
I could probably explain this by recalling Kant’s assumption of a possible purpose without 
purposiveness, as it carries the impossibility of judgment, which in his Third Critique lives on 
borrowed time. Away from aesthetics and closer to how we do art in all its travesties, judgment 
must be seen for what it is: a mere philosophical convenience adopted by those who cannot 
assume a world outside the fence of grammatical legitimation where particulars have to respond 
to universals. Yet the Third Critique forfeits such a desire in his Analytic of the Sublime. This 
reconfirms Kant’s genius, as it becomes evident that grammatical legitimation is nonsense. (And 
I refuse to accept that Kant had no sense of humor). 
 
By way of concluding, let us remind ourselves of the aporia by which art must always be 
unlearnt: Any attempt to forego the tautology of “art as art” leaves us with no choice but to 
unlearn the same pedagogical thinking and practices that are claimed through art and with them 
all that is assumed to be artistic. Failing to accept such a state of affairs amounts to the 
perpetuated illusion that art, like education and philosophy, are somewhat necessary. 
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